Several studies have explored the relationship between economy level crime rates or individual level crime and economic growth. However, few studies have examined the relationship between economic growth and crime against firms which is an important issue especially for developing economies. Using data for about 12,000 firms in 27 developing countries we find that economic growth has a negative effect on crime. We also find that several macro-economic factors can weaken or strengthen the relationship between crime and economic growth. The results are robust to various sensitivity checks.
Introduction
Several studies have explored the relationship between crime and economic growth. In general economic growth increases job market opportunities, consequently raising the opportunity cost of engaging in illegitimate activities (Becker, 1968) . Furthermore economic growth may increase tax revenues resulting in higher government budgets for crime prevention (Cook, 2010; Levitt, 2004) . Both mechanisms propose an inverse relationship between economic growth and crime.
However, economic growth also serves as an indicator of increasing prosperity and thus the effect on crime may depend on the level of risk aversion (Ehrlich, 1973) . Increasing prosperity may encourage crime-prone behavior such as individuals leaving their houses more often, increasing alcohol consumption, or owning more cars. Finally legal institutions, being typically slow to adapt, may find it difficult to deal with rapid economic growth and thus providing more leeway for criminals to escape punishment, and thus reducing the costs of engaging in illegitimate activities. In general, empirical findings have indicated a negative relationship between economic growth and crime (Fajnzylber et al, 2002; Bourguignon, 1999; Dutta, 2009 ).
Most of the literature mentioned above concerns overall crime rates in an economy, or crime against households. A natural extension of this literature would be to examine the link between economic growth and crime against firms since overall crime rate results do not give any indication of how the results apply only to firms. Given the importance of private firms in aiding development in less developed economies, it is important to examine how the relationship between economic growth and crime fairs at the firm level. A few mechanisms translate well with regards to crime against firms. Economic growth resulting in increasing economic opportunities of individuals makes firms less susceptible to theft, and rising government spending on crime may complement a firm's security measures. However, in terms of risk prone behavior induced by economic growth, it is unlikely that alcohol consumption or increasing outings by individuals is highly correlated with crime against firms, although there may be increases in firm spending on items such as cars across all sizes of firms that may attract criminal activity. On the other hand, the rate at which legal institutions adapt to increasing economic growth will determine the level of crime against firms.
There is very limited research done on crime against firms. Previous studies have found that firms have higher rates of victimization than households. About 24% of retailers and manufacturers were burgled in 1993 in contrast to 5.6% of households in Britain (Hopkins, 2002) . For Latin American countries, large firms experience more crime than small firms, although small firms face a larger burden of crime (Amin, 2009) . In Africa, ownership of informal firms matter, with firms owned by immigrants being more susceptible to a crime than native owned firms.
The relationship between economic growth and crime against firms is an important macro-micro link for developing economies. As far as we know, this is the first study to explore the relationship between the burden of crime against firms, as measured by losses due to crime as a % of sales, and economic growth. Given the data limitation, it is impossible to comprehensively identify a causal link. Thus the goal of this study is to quantify the correlation between economic growth and crime against firms, and then explore this relationship further in terms of several socio-economic and firm characteristics.
In order to examine the relationship between growth and crime, we use a unique firm level dataset with about 12,000 firms in 27 developing countries maintained by the World Bank's Enterprise Analysis unit (Enterprise Surveys). We find that an increase in real GDP per capita growth by 1 standard deviation results in a 0.09 standard deviation reduction in the losses due to crime. We find that female ownership and management strengthens the relationship between economic growth and losses due to crime. While a large police force, good governance, and greater voter turnout in elections are good substitutes for economic growth in the context of reducing losses due to crime. We use % of land in the tropics, and malaria risk index as instruments and find that the results are retained, if not magnified. The results are also robust to various sensitivity checks.
Section 2 describes the data, section 3 provides the estimation and results, and sections 4, 5, and 6 provide instrumental variable estimations, robustness checks, and conclusions respectively.
Data and Main Variables
The data for firm level variables are collected by the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys. The Enterprise Surveys use standard survey instruments to collect firm-level data on a country's business environment from business owners and top managers. The surveys cover a broad range of topics including access to finance, corruption, infrastructure, crime, competition, labor, obstacles to growth and performance measures. The survey is designed to be representative of a country's private non-agricultural economy and only registered firms with at least five employees are included in the sample. The data consists of a random sample of 12,000 firms across 27 developing countries in different regions stratified by firm size, location, and sector. 
Dependent variable
The main dependent variable utilized is losses due to crime as a percentage of annual sales. This variable is derived from the survey question: "In fiscal year [insert fiscal year] , what are the estimated losses as a result of theft, robbery, vandalism or arson that occurred on establishment's premises calculated as a percent of annual sales or the total annual value of the losses?"
For total values of crime, the percentage over sales is calculated. Crime losses as a % of sale capture the intensity of crime. We make no distinction between a firm that has experienced no crime and a firm that has experienced crime but incurred no losses. Both firms get a zero value for the dependent variable. The variable averages 0.72% in the sample with a standard deviation of 3.9%. Using country averages across all firms, Azerbaijan has the lowest amount of crime losses at 0.20% of sales, while El Salvador has the highest with 1.73%.
We also include an estimation where the dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether or not a firm has experienced crime in the last fiscal year. The survey question is phrased as follows: "In fiscal year [insert last complete fiscal year], has this establishment experienced losses as a result of theft, robbery, vandalism or arson?" This estimation elucidates the relationship between economic growth and the incidence of crime as opposed to the burden of crime.
Explanatory variable
The main variable of interest is real GDP per capita growth rate which is available for the years the firm surveys were undertaken. The sample mean for the rate of economic growth is 2.66% while a standard deviation of 4.2%. Belarus and Romania are the fastest growing economies in the sample with growth rates of 10.2% and 9.6% respectively. The country average crime losses and economic growth rates are presented in table A4 for each country in the appendix.
3 Other explanatory variables
We control for several firm level and country level variables. The degree of crime a firm faces may depend on its size, the sector it belongs to, and its locale. We control for firm size using dummies for small and medium firms. A small firm is defined as a firm with less than 20 employees, while a medium firm has workers between 20 and 99. We also have a dummy for manufacturing firms. A priori it is not clear whether a manufacturing firm should have higher crime losses with respect to other sectors. We also include a city size dummy which takes the value of 1 if the city has a population of 250,000 of greater, or is a capital city, and 0 otherwise.
We also include a dummy for whether a firm has at least one female owner. All these variables are from the Enterprise Survey's data set.
At the country level we control for the number of police per 100,000 of population. The variable is obtained from United Nations Survey on Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems. The variable is typically lagged by 1 year, however due to data constraints, for some countries the lag is not exactly one year previous, but a few years before in certain cases. The specific details of the number of lags are available in table A3 in the appendix. We also control Real GNI per capita and the country wide Gini index given their prominence in the literature. For cases where data for the exact date is unavailable, we use data for the closest date available. The exact year of data used for GNI per capita and the Gini index are presented in table A3 in the appendix. We finally control for country size using the total population of the country. These data are available from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. Data source and description of the variable can be found in table A1, with summary statistics in table A2.
Estimation
We estimate following equation using OLS for crime losses, and Tobit estimation for crime experience. Where crime is the losses due to crime as a % of sales of a dummy representing whether a firm experienced crime in the last fiscal year, GDPgr is the real GDP per capita growth rate,
Policelag is the lagged number of police per 100,000 population, Fem is a dummy representing female ownership, GNIcap is the real GNI per capita, GINI is the Gini coefficient, Population is the total population of the economy, Small and Medium are firm size dummies, LargeCity is a dummy for cities with population of 250,000 and greater, or capital cities, and finally Manf is a dummy for manufacturing firms.
All estimates are based on standard errors clustered at the country level. In the later sections we add additional variables and interact them with the variable of interest to elucidate several relationships. The usual econometric issues of endogeneity and omitted variable bias are of a concern in the estimation. Reverse causality is an issue given that higher crime can lead to slower economic growth. We also have the issue of omitted variable bias as economic growth may be correlated with several factors. Both issues are challenging given data limitations. We address this by using various checks as presented in the robustness section including instruments.
Base Regression Results
All magnitudes discussed in the text are presented in standard deviation units, unless indicated. are unchanged when the estimation is done without any controls. The reduction in crime losses when the controls are excluded from the estimation is 0.055, significant at 1%. These results indicate that economic growth may be a deterrent for crime against firms. One reason could be that economic growth increases the opportunity cost of criminal activities leading to less crime. This is consistent with studies for individual level crime (Bourguignon, 1999; Fajnzylber et al., 2002) .
A few other results stand out. Firms with female owners are both more likely to experience crime, and also face a higher percentage of losses due to crime over sales. A couple of results retain significance but switch signs when comparing the impact on likelihood of experiencing crime (incidence of crime) and the losses due to crime (burden of crime). GNI per capita seems to increase the likelihood of experiencing crime while reducing the losses due to crime. That is, with higher income, crime against firms becomes more widespread but also more petty. Income per capita has generally shown non robust results with regards to individual level crime in the literature (Fajnzylber et al., 2002; Soares, 2004) 1 . Additionally, small and medium firms are less likely to experience crime than large firms, but face higher losses due to crime, which has been also found in previous studies (Amin, 2009) . The size of the country in terms of population has a 1 Due to the lack of continuous data for GNI per capita for some countries, we use the GDP growth rate instead of the GNI growth rate as our indicator for economic growth. This is typical in the literature (Fajnzylber et al, 2002) . The results for female ownership are retained if we use the level of GDP per capita instead of GNI per capita.
positive effect on losses due to crime, but no effect on the incidence of crime. Thus, in larger economies, firms have higher losses due to crime.
We now consider how several country and firm-level factors may influence the relationship between economic growth and the burden of crime on firms. Economic growth may not only represent labor market opportunities, but may also capture the quality of legal and public institutions . Thus we examine the strength of the relationship between economic growth and crime and how this relationship depends on factors such as police, female ownership and management, governance and voter turnouts in elections. The relationship between police, governance and crime have been explored in the literature, and thus we expect the effect of economic growth may be conditional these factors. We also use voter turnout as a proxy for social organization, and thus it would be interesting to see if the effect of economic growth is strengthened by social organization, or weakened by its presence. Finally, given the robust positive relationship between female ownership and management and crime, which is consistent with female headed households and crime, we examine whether economic growth weakens of strengthens this relationship. We use the estimation results in table 1, column 2 as the base as there is a more straightforward interpretation with regards to the magnitude of the effects of interaction variables. Both the Logit and OLS estimations provide qualitatively similar results for economic growth
Number of Police
The interaction term between number of police and economic growth is positive and significant at 5%. The overall effect of economic growth on crime losses is still negative at the sample mean number of police after interacting economic growth with police. However, looking at the extremes of the sample, economic growth has no significant effect on crime losses at the sample maximum number of police, but has a large and significant negative effect at the sample minimum number of police. The magnitudes are presented in column 1 of table 2. The effect of increasing economic growth by 1 standard deviation results in a 0.008 standard deviation reduction in crime losses at the sample mean number of police, and 0.149 standard deviation units at the lowest number of police in the sample, both results significant at 1%. The number of police turning point, after which the effect of economic growth on crime losses is insignificant, in the sample is 425 per 100,000 of population, which is at the 83 percentile of the sample. The implication of these results may indicate that a larger police force may be a substitute for the economic growth when it comes to reducing crime against firms.
Female Ownership and Management
The interaction term between female ownership and management and economic growth is positive and significant at 5%. Economic growth reduces crime losses whether or not a firm has a female or male owner, but the magnitude of the effect is larger if the firm has a female owner, or both a female manager and female owners as shown in columns 2 and 3 of table 2. The results indicate that a one standard deviation increase in economic growth results in a 0.102 standard deviation reduction in the dependent variable for female owned firms, in contrast to 0.074 standard deviation reduction for firms that do not have a female owner. The magnitude is even greater for firms with both a female owner and female manager at 0.139 in contrast to 0.081 for firms that have all male owners and managers. An interpretation of this result is that economic growth benefits the more vulnerable or less well off in a society.
Governance
We use ICRG's Quality of government indicator as a measure of governance. The interaction term between Quality of Government and Economic growth is positive and significant at 10%.
Economic growth has a negative and significant relationship with crime losses at the sample mean of the governance indicator. However, this relationship turns insignificant at the sample maximum of the governance indicator. At the sample minimum level of governance, the effect of economic growth increases in magnitude while retaining significance, when compared to the mean level of governance. In column 1 of table 3, we present the magnitudes at the bottom. A one standard deviation increase in economic growth results in an approximately 0.095 and 0.144 standard deviation reduction in crime losses for the sample mean and minimum respectively.
One interpretation is that better governance is a substitute for the crime-reducing effect of economic growth.
Voter Turnout
Social disorganization theory indicates that factors that diminish the effectiveness of informal social controls increase criminal activity (Kelly, 2000) . Two major concerns about the estimation results are that the relationship between economic growth and losses due to crime are reverse causality and omitted variable bias. Essentially, an increase in losses due to crime can deter economic growth. Similarly, economic growth may be capturing something else such as institutions that are not included in the estimations. We mitigate this possibility by using instruments and subjecting the base estimates to several robustness checks.
Instrumental Variables
We use two instruments for economic growth: the % of land in tropics for each country, and malaria risk index, which is the proportion of each country's population that live with risk of malaria transmission in 1994 developed by Sachs and Gallup (2004) . Both these variables have been found to be an important determinant of economic growth (Sachs et al, 1998 conventional levels of significance. Thus we cannot reject the null that all the instruments are valid. We also reject that the estimation is underidentified at 5% level of significance.
Robustness
We check for the robustness in terms of model specification. Several studies have shown that demographics and human capital (Kovandzic and Sloan, 2002; Kelly, 2000; Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2004) , corruption (Gaviria, 2002) , fractionalization (Fajnzylber et al, 2000) , trade (Ghosh et al., 2011) , prison population (Kovandzic and Sloan, 2002; levitt, 2004) , and government spending (Naidoo, 2006) are factors that influence crime. We add sets of variables that proxy for the aforementioned factors and present the results in table A5. We also include firm level variables such as total employees and security costs as a % of total sales and check if they affect our estimation of interest. We also control for inflation, using it as an indicator of macroeconomic stability. As shown in table A5, including these sets of variables do not improve the goodness of fit, the explanatory power of the model, or reduce the significance of the variable of interest.
We also worry that extreme observations in the sample may be driving the results. Thus we omit the top 1%, bottom 1 %, and top and bottom 1% observations of losses due to crime as well economic growth, to see if our results are retained. As indicated in table A6, the significance of our results is unaffected.
Finally, we worry that our results may be dominated by certain countries. Thus we drop one country at a go from the sample and see if the coefficient of economic growth retains the signs and significance. As indicated by figure A1 , the results are not dominated by any particular country in the sample as we retain the sign and significance at 5%.
Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature by examining the relationship between economic growth and crime against firms, a fairly under-researched area. The paper finds a negative relationship between firm losses due to crime and economic growth. Expressed in terms of standard deviations, we find that an increase in real GDP per capita growth by 1 standard deviation results in a 0.09 standard deviation reduction in the losses due to crime over total sales. The suggested mechanism for this effect is that economic growth increases opportunities elsewhere and thus increasing the opportunity cost of crime. We find that economic growth is more effective in reducing crime loses for firms with female owners and managers.
Possible ways to extend this paper would be to check if the results hold for developed economies as well. It would also be interesting to formally explore various channels through which economic growth affects crime. Finally, estimations with some time variation in the data would be able to test some of the relationships presented in this paper more rigorously. -0.102*** -0.139*** * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, Standard errors in brackets clustered at the country level 0  r1  r2  r3  r4  r5  r6  r7  r8  r9  r10  r11  r12  r13  r14  r15  r16  r17  r18  r19  r20  r21  r22  r23  r24  r25  r26  r27  r28 Country Dominance coef -95%
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